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INTRODUCTION
Land reform has become a commonplace development
strategy in nations around the world. Agrarian reform is an
attractive method of doing development work because it focuses
on land as one of the primary social goods available within every
state. Some land reform programs set forth to provide clear legal
title to landowners who occupy land under customary land
tenure agreements. Other models of agrarian reform attempt to
resolve land-related disputes in an effort to clarify land rights.
Yet another array of programs broadens access to arable land;
this redistributive variety of land reform is the focus of this
Article.
While it is tempting to think of these programs as a panacea,
they can fail for an array of reasons. Failed land reform
undermines all land reform efforts because it creates a
fundamental skepticism about why nations should even bother to
attempt to broaden access to land. Land reform’s typically
inchoate goals likewise compound this effect of leaving initiatives
rootless, resulting in an open question as to whether land reform
is a worthwhile endeavor. But the reality is that land reform is a
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noble, valuable cause. Properly executed land reform reduces
poverty, permits families to accrue wealth, and helps nations
fulfill their human rights obligations.1 It also builds human
capacity, which endows developing2 nations with the most
valuable resource: citizens capable of solving the toughest
problems their countries face.3 In addition, land reform can
achieve expressive goals, giving citizens a sense of identity and a
nation a sense of pride in its own potential as a competent,
autonomous, modern state.4 These practical and expressive goals
are many and real, and they can have a significant impact on the
shape of land reform programs. But they too often go unstated,
and the result is a land reform program that is detached from its
own aspirations.
This Article begins the project of constructing a unified
account of land reform. This model consists of two central
aspects. First, it articulates a set of goals, both practical and
expressive, that redistributive land reform efforts can forward.
Second, it offers a pragmatic theory of land reform, one that
simultaneously achieves the progressive, poverty-eradication
goals of land reform proponents and satisfies neoliberal demand
for stable land markets. In this regard, the project offers a fresh
way of thinking of the intractable conflict in land reform policy:
how to redistribute land without destabilizing the nation. In
addressing this problem, the Article brings a conversation about
land reform that primarily exists in development studies into the
legal literature and informs that discussion with legal insights.

1

See infra Parts I.A.1, 2, and 4.
The language of developed and developing is a contested shorthand to describe
distinctions among nations with regard to gross domestic product. Many alternatives
exist, such as first-, second-, and third-world, industrialized and unindustrialized, or
global north and global south, but all of these are plagued with problems. This
Article mostly refers to developing countries, or occasionally countries of the global
south, but acknowledges the awkwardness of choosing a shorthand for these
descriptions. Dayo Olopade, Op-Ed., The End of the ‘Developing World’, N.Y. TIMES
Mar. 2, 2014, at SR4 (advocating for the use of the terms “fat” and “lean”). Martha
Nussbaum has observed that “[a]ll countries are ‘developing countries,’ although
that phrase is sometimes used to refer to poorer countries: every nation has a lot of
room for improvement in delivering an adequate quality of life to all its people.”
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH, at x (2011).
3
See infra Part I.A.3.
4
See infra Part I.B.
2
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly defines
what redistributive land reform is before moving on to identify
and discuss land reform’s pragmatic and expressive goals. Part
II takes on the controversial problem of redistribution. It
differentiates between expropriation-based models of land reform
and market-compatible models, explains how expropriation can
undermine
development
goals,
and
reveals
how
market-compatible approaches maintain the economic stability
needed for meaningful development. Part III fleshes out how
land reform programs operate, distinguishing among different
land reform strategies. The Article concludes by observing that
while market-compatible land reform makes good sense, both
logically and theoretically, it will rise or fall based on whether
enough land is made available to address the problem of rural
poverty; it calls upon legal scholars of many doctrines to help
shape policies and laws that support robust land reform
initiatives.
I. GOALS OF LAND REFORM
Land reform programs operate with a multifaceted approach
to resolving public policy problems regarding agricultural lands,
including, first, efforts to formalize title5 and, second, dispute
resolution processes to quiet title conflicts.6 A third kind of
agrarian reform is based on redistributive efforts designed to
democratize land access.7 All of these programs are typically
pursued as one component of a larger movement to reform land
tenure, access, and security. While titling and land conflict
resolutions are important agrarian reform topics, they are
5

Formalization of title is the topic of a broad literature, both from legal and
development scholars. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:
WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 46–62
(2003) (discussing the benefits of titling and other aspects of a formal property
system). While this topic is discussed further in the analysis of the value of title for
land reform beneficiaries, see infra Part I.B.2, this Article focuses on land reform
initiatives dedicated to redistribution of lands, not formalization of title.
6
For example, Indonesia’s agrarian reform program includes dispute resolution,
in light of more than 7,000 significant land disputes and conflicts in 2007. Joyo
Winoto, Taking Land Policy and Administration in Indonesia to the Next Stage, in
INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS RECOGNITION, ADMINISTRATION, AND GOVERNANCE 1,
2–3, 7 (Klaus Deininger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN LAND
RIGHTS].
7
SATURNINO M. BORRAS, JR., PRO-POOR LAND REFORM: A CRITIQUE 1 (2007)
(stating that redistribution of land is a current issue in international development).
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peripheral to this Article, which focuses on redistributive efforts.
For the remainder of this Article, the term “land reform” denotes
this kind of program designed to broaden access to land.
In order to critically analyze this kind of redistributive land
reform and the mechanisms used to accomplish it, it is crucial to
grasp the logic that underlies efforts to redistribute lands and
understand why a government might want to pursue land
reform. Land reform is one of the most practical forms of modern
international development work in the global south.
The
possession of land is a bulwark against food insecurity,8 poverty,9
and social upheaval.10 The ability to borrow against land may
provide poor persons in many countries with access to a
previously unknown level of financial security through the ability
to purchase additional real property, develop small businesses, or
support children in their pursuit of higher education.11 In these
regards, land reform serves the deeply practical goal of
improving the concrete well-being of a country’s population.
Coupled with these pragmatic functions, democratizing real
property ownership in developing countries demonstrates the
rise of democratic regimes and the retreat of colonialist
governance models.12 Within countries accustomed to wealth
concentration in the hands of few, land reform signifies a shift
from colonialist values to the reality of a more egalitarian state,
one in which the nation’s wealth accrues to a wide array of
citizens instead of only the privileged, foreigners, and outside
investors. Land reform thus represents popular hopes in poor
countries: that average people, too, may have access to their
homeland’s patrimony. This Part of the Article serves to identify
and explain the many goals that nations may attempt to
accomplish by investing public money and effort into land reform
programs. These goals are what make land reform a cause
worthy of public support and additional scholarly consideration.

8
Thembela Kepe & Danielle Tessaro, Integrating Food Security with Land
Reform: A More Effective Policy for South Africa, CIGI-AFRICA INITIATIVE POLICY
BRIEF SERIES, Aug. 2012, at 1, 1–2.
9
Krishna B. Ghimire, Land Reform at the End of the Twentieth Century, in
LAND REFORM & PEASANT LIVELIHOODS 1, 1 (Krishna B. Ghimire ed., 2001).
10
Id. at 2.
11
DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 48, 216.
12
Cherryl Walker et al., Introduction to LAND, MEMORY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND
JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LAND CLAIMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (Cherryl Walker et al.,
eds., 2010).
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Pragmatic Goals of Land Reform

Land reform is most valuable because it can improve the
lives of actual poor people who live in rural parts of developing
countries.
This simple statement belies the multifaceted
complexity of what land reform might accomplish in poor rural
communities. Articulating these pragmatic goals serves multiple
purposes. First, it offers a practical justification for efforts to
democratize land access. A social welfare program that serves no
meaningful purpose in society is arguably pointless and probably
even poses problems of moral hazard.13 Second, providing a
public rationale for investing public resources in programs to
democratize land access legitimizes social safety net programs.
Understanding what a nation is trying to accomplish with land
reform and why that is socially relevant and valuable is a crucial
first step in being able to evaluate the relative successes and
failures of various approaches to these programs.
1.

Land Reform Reduces Poverty and Its Worst Consequences

Land ownership can play a significant role in solving the
problem of rural poverty. For the landless rural poor, lacking
meaningful access to their own land to cultivate means they are
constantly dependent on wage labor to support their families. In
rural places where the economy is based on small family
businesses that provide few employment opportunities to
strangers, scarce wage labor can be a recipe for constant
economic insecurity.14 Gaining access to land allows a steadier

13
Land reform initiatives that do not tangibly improve the lot of the intended
beneficiaries often saddle poor people with debt and unproductive land while
potentially providing benefits of electoral popularity and support to the elected
officials who initiated the programs. States are unlikely to avoid these kinds of
flawed land reform initiatives, unless the state is actively paying to support them,
and the state is protected against risks associated with these programs by shifting
them onto indebted participants in land reform programs. Thus, this scenario poses
a moral hazard which effectively leads to the subsidization of a larger amount of
ineffective land reform than would typically be justified. Martha T. McCluskey,
Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
115, 138–39 (2000) (discussing with skepticism moral hazard and its use to reject
social assistance programs). However, because the worst consequences of failed land
reform programs land squarely on poor people, advocates for the rural poor should
be skeptical of ill-conceived redistributive land reform programs that worsen the lot
of the rural poor.
14
Sam Moyo, Land and Natural Resource Redistribution in Zimbabwe: Access,
Equity and Conflict, 4 AFR. & ASIAN STUD. 187, 190 (2005) (“Formal employment is
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form of economic support that offers food, money, and security,
because land is the primary source of livelihood for rural
citizens.15 Land has historically signified security to families
that own it;16 modern land reform efforts are predicated in no
small part on an attempt to provide economic security to the
rural poor who rely on access to land as a form of wealth and
stability. Gaining land through land reform can help poor rural
families achieve economic and food security that was unavailable
to them as landless rural farmworkers.
Development economists and social scientists have
documented these important development consequences of land
reform.17 Well-respected development organizations, including
the United Nations Development Program, have acted on these
findings by dedicating substantial effort to encouraging land
reform initiatives.18 Countries instigating land reform efforts
therefore are often choosing to do so for purposes of poverty
eradication.19 However, unlike other important public assistance
models, such as cash transfers, land reform is envisioned as a
form of social welfare policy that relies on individual engagement
to be successful; it equips families and individuals in poverty

unable to absorb the numerous unemployed, land-short, landless and homeless.”
(citation omitted)).
15
Id. at 188 (“[Land and national] resources are the key direct source of
livelihood and wealth for the majority [in Africa]. They are also the means through
which the poor pay for their education, health services, and hence a critical means to
attain non-agricultural employment.”). Legal scholar Lisa Pruitt has observed that,
in 2012, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women featured as its
theme “the empowerment of rural women and their role in poverty and hunger
eradication, development and current challenges,” but that even though women and
girls reinvest ninety percent of their income in their families, they own less than two
percent of land. See Lisa Pruitt, Rural Women and the Limits of Law: Reflections on
CSW 56, JURIST (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/03/lisa-pruittun-women.php#.U1Vk_cYnL1o (internal quotation marks omitted). Providing
women with access to land is therefore a promising strategy for increasing food
security and eradicating hunger and poverty.
16
See Shelley Cavalieri, Theorizing Land Reform (July 9, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing at length the role of land in signifying
social status).
17
See generally Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Land Reform, Poverty
Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India, 115 Q.J. ECON. 389 (2000).
18
Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Terry McKinley, The Unresolved Land Reform
Debate: Beyond State-Led or Market-Led Models, UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME,
Nov.
2006,
at
1,
3,
available
at
http://www.ipcundp.org/pub/IPCPolicyResearchBrief2.pdf.
19
See Besley & Burgess, supra note 17, at 392–94.
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with the means to overcome their own economic deprivation
without requiring continuous infusions of government funds to do
so.20
2.

Land Reform Can Provide Title, Which Allows Families To
Accrue Wealth

Land reform may also lead to the kind of land titling that
economists have demonstrated helps poor families accumulate
adequate economic resources to engage more meaningfully in the
modern economy of developing nations. Hernando de Soto’s work
on the topic of titles to land has argued that lack of access to a
stable, marketable land title denies poor families entrée to the
economic opportunities that capital provides.21 Land with secure
title, against which families are able to borrow, can help
smallholders obtain capital that can be used to achieve other
goals.22 Such capital can be a source of financial security to
purchase real estate, develop small businesses, or support
children’s education.23 De Soto’s work has documented the
capital-generating aspects of titling and how titles can provide
families with greater economic security than they possessed prior
to obtaining land and stable title; he has argued that this creates
long-term change within a society.24 As a result of this body of
scholarship, many nations have undertaken efforts to clarify title
to property.25

20
Of course, in the instance of land reform accomplished by means of state-led
distribution of land, this claim is somewhat misleading. If the state transfers land to
the poor instead of transferring money to the poor, it has in essence made a wealth
transfer in either instance. The only distinction, of course, is that conveying land
may equip those who are poor to be able to address their own poverty without
continued government involvement through repeated cash transfers. Cash transfers
are an important poverty-eradication strategy, but they require a steadily funded
government to continue to provide them. Despite this potential problem,
development economists remain focused on the possibility of conditional cash
transfers as a means of incentivizing the creation of human capital. See generally
Julia Johannsen et al., Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: Problems and
Opportunities (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/2530.
21
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD 159–61 (June Abbott trans., 1989).
22
DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 48, 216.
23
Id. at 39–40.
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Rita Sinha, Moving Towards Clear Land Titles in India: Potential
Benefits, a Road Map, and Remaining Challenges, in INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS,
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This discussion of the benefits of land titling is not without
its critics. Development and legal scholars alike have critiqued
this individualized approach to land ownership by noting that it
destroys communal and historic models of land tenure26 and
observing that it may not generate the “security of tenure,
investment and increased productivity” that are the hallmarks of
de Soto’s approach.27 Yet even though communal ownership of
property may preclude community members from accessing this
range of possible benefits, indigenous communities that are wellversed in the consequences of losing indigenous lands due to sale
by individual owners may instead prefer to hold land
communally, with restraints on alienation.28
Though such
restraints clearly limit individuals’ abilities to alienate the
property or borrow against it, the American Indian experience of
allotment has underscored the fact that distributing communal
lands to individuals too often leads to the sale of the property,29
and with it, the loss of the site of communal identity.30 The
identifiable benefits of land titling, therefore, should be
considered as one of the range of possible goals that land reform
could achieve; however, alternative models of reform might
instead prioritize goals of poverty eradication that can be
accomplished while title is held in a communal fashion in order
to prevent the destruction of traditional land tenure practices.31

supra note 6, at 14–20 (describing the system India initiated in 2008 to create clear
property titles).
26
Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the
Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 527–28 (2011).
27
See Philippe Lavigne Delville, Registering and Administering Customary
Land Rights: Can We Deal with Complexity?, in INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS,
supra note 6, at 26. See generally D. BENJAMIN BARROS, HERNANDO DE SOTO AND
PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY (D. Benjamin Barros ed., 2010).
28
See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 763 (3d ed. 2010) (observing how
American Indian tribal governments often attempt to put newly acquired tribal
lands under the trust status in which tribal title is held).
29
See Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying To Rest the Ghosts of
Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 134–35 & n.29 (2012) (discussing
how the reduction of government support of Indians and changes in agriculture left
individual Indian allotment owners in desperate economic straits and thus willing to
sell their allotments).
30
See Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes
the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 381, 394–95 (1997).
31
See infra Part III.C.
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Land Reform Builds Human Capability

The shift from life as a landless rural peasant to living as a
smallholding farmer is not merely a quantitative increase in
income but a dramatic qualitative change in kind for the lifestyle
of land reform beneficiaries. Landless rural peasants earn wages
while performing the tasks assigned to them by the owner or
crew chief in the fields that belong to others. In some instances,
this role can be a steady, year-round form of employment. Far
more commonly, the historically stable relationship between a
landowner and farmhands, through which an owner would
employ and house an entire family, has eroded into a seasonal
role, day labor, or even piecework.32 For landless peasants, this
kind of temporary labor relationship means that workers
maintain relatively little day-to-day control over the tasks that
comprise their work or decision-making authority to determine
how and when work is performed. Instead, owners or their hired
crew chiefs decide what agricultural tasks need to be performed
on a daily or weekly basis and assign those tasks to the
workers.33
Worse yet, the contingent nature of the work
situations reduces landless peasants’ abilities to plan for steady
income or to structure their time while waiting for work to
materialize.
In contrast, land reform can transform the lives of its
beneficiaries. When land reform puts agricultural property in
the possession of former farm workers, management decisions
become the responsibility of the individual smallholder or the
leadership body of a farm held collectively.34 Such a dramatic

32
This is certainly the case in Guatemala, where the traditional ongoing
relationships that farmworkers formed with the owners of the land on which they
worked and lived have disappeared. While there is far less paternalism endemic to
the new relationships, landowners no longer have obligations for social insurance,
holiday pay, medical expenses, and other costs that historically would have been
shifted onto the property owner. David McCreery, Coffee and Indigenous Labor in
Guatemala, 1871-1980, in THE GLOBAL COFFEE ECONOMY IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND
LATIN AMERICA, 1500–1989, at 191, 199 (William Gervase Clarence-Smith & Steven
Topik eds., 2003).
33
Id. at 196–97.
34
See infra Part III.C for a discussion of individual and collective models of land
ownership.
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increase in autonomy can be both terrifying and empowering for
individuals who have previously spent their lives working the
fields of other landowners.35
This facet of land reform demonstrates how it likewise serves
the pragmatic goal of building human capacity. As articulated by
the human capabilities approach to development, a theory of
international development most closely associated with
economist Amartya Sen and legal philosopher Martha
Nussbaum,36 state actions should focus on increasing individuals’
ability to achieve the ends they wish to pursue.37 Although this
theory has its roots as an economic model in Sen’s version,38 and
an Aristotelian approach to philosophy in the work of
Nussbaum,39 the capabilities approach to human development
has subsequently attracted a substantial following in the field of
development economics and has taken meaningful root in the
international arena.40
Land reform responds to the fundamental concern of the
capabilities approach to development, which is how to provide
individuals with capability, defined as “the substantive freedom
to achieve alternative functioning combinations.”41 Functionings
35
Land reform can serve to reduce the constraints on autonomy experienced by
poor rural citizens of developing nations. Although constrained autonomy is not
unique to those at the bottom of social hierarchies, since all people operate with
some limitations on their array of choices, those with fewer privileges commonly
have the most circumscribed set of options before them, though this should not be
viewed as preventing them from exercising their own agency. See Aya Gruber, The
Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 813–16 (discussing limited sets of
options and embracing the self-determination rights of persons with fewer choices in
the context of domestic violence). To the extent that technical assistance can
improve land reform beneficiaries’ odds of success by increasing their skills set,
many governments undertaking land reform initiatives offer these kinds of
programs. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the range of possible government
involvement in land reform efforts.
36
Shelley Cavalieri, Capabilities Approach, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY STUDIES (Nancy A. Naples et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2016).
37
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18 (1999).
38
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 11 (2000).
39
SEN, supra note 37, at 24.
40
See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013,
at
64
(2013),
available
at
hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/
hdr2013_en_complete.pdf (“[G]iving primacy to state investment in people’s
capabilities—especially their health, education and nutrition,” combined with
increasing their resiliency, “has paid human development dividends.”).
41
SEN, supra note 37, at 75.
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are “the various things a person may value doing or being,” and
they can range from health and well-being to the pursuit of life
goals and purpose.42 But functionings themselves are not the
purpose of the capabilities approach; instead, it is the capacity
that the functionings provide to individuals so they can pursue
their own life ends and their own vision of the good.43 Land may
well be the kind of good that capacitates individuals to access an
array of other functionings, including the income to pay for food,
health care, and education, as well as the intangibles of dignity,
self-respect, and a sense of autonomy. Land reform may thus be
responsive to this kind of concern by providing a means to access
other life purposes, as opposed to simply allowing the state to
directly provide the raw materials.44
One aspect of the capabilities approach that is particularly
applicable in the land reform context is that this model does not
mandate a particular set of life choices.45 The capabilities
approach offers a helpful framework for contemplating land
reform because it demands that individuals have meaningful
options available to them in life.46 Land reform satisfies the
basic requirements of the capabilities approach because it
addresses the root source of rural poverty in the developing
world: the lack of meaningful options for sources of income for
landless peasants. But it also honors the other key aspect of the
capabilities approach by allowing individuals a great degree of
freedom in living with this solution and thereby augmenting the
variety of options available to individuals. Under the capabilities
approach, access to land can be part of the range of goods that an
individual can use to pursue his or her own life goals.
Participation in market-compatible land reform is voluntary
insofar as states do not mandate that individuals partake. But
the capabilities approach does not only give individuals a set of
goods with which to pursue their own ends. It also enables
people to develop increasingly sophisticated capacity to attempt
further goals and outcomes. The capacities that land reform

42

Id.
See id.
44
This is also true in the context of interventions in trafficking for sex work. See
Shelley Cavalieri, Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way Feminist Account of
Trafficking for Sex Work, 86 IND. L.J. 1409, 1457 (2011).
45
See SEN, supra note 37, at 75–81.
46
See id.
43
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builds are not purely provided by the set of primary social goods
that land reform can offer through economic security; they also
are a set of skills that result from building the autonomy of land
reform beneficiaries. Learning to run a small business and to
operate with authority over their own labor represents a
substantial increase in the human capital of those who receive
land.
4.

Land Reform Helps Nations Fulfill Their Human Rights
Obligations

Land reform can also serve the important function of
furthering the stated goals of human rights treaties, including
ensuring the rights of all people to participate in cultural life47
and to earn a living through work,48 thereby bringing states that
are implementing these kinds of programs into closer compliance
with their treaty obligations. While the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides only for the
progressive realization of its mandates,49 land reform can
accomplish some aspects of this ongoing, progressive approach to
development.50 Rights to work51 and to remuneration, which
provides a decent living,52 are supported by government efforts to
broaden the base of land ownership in a nation. When the
landless rural poor spend their lives as temporary employees on
the farms owned by others, they rarely have the ability to earn
adequately to support their families.
But land ownership
provides what functions as a small business opportunity,
allowing individuals to work for themselves. Likewise, rights to
food53 and housing54 are furthered by land, which gives
individuals access to subsistence-level farming and to a place to

47
See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
48
See id. art. 6.
49
See id. art. 2.
50
Id. (requiring state parties to take steps toward, not achieve, the rights
established in the covenant).
51
Id. art. 6.
52
Id. art. 7.
53
Id. art. 11.
54
Id.
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build housing for their families. States that offer land reform as
a means of reducing rural poverty are simultaneously fulfilling
their treaty obligations.
More recent human rights conventions have treated land
reform as its own topic worthy of consideration. Article 14(2)(g)
of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (“CEDAW”) specifically mentions agrarian reform in the
context of women’s human rights:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate
in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall
ensure to such women the right . . . [t]o have access to
agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate
technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as
well as in land resettlement schemes . . . .55

While this article of CEDAW is focused on creating equality
in access to land reform initiatives among men and women,
inclusion of land reform in this relatively recent human rights
convention suggests that land reform is increasingly a
substantial topic of discussion in human rights and international
development circles. Furthermore, that Article 14 specifically
enumerates the needs of rural women as a distinct category of
women suggests that rural populations warrant human rights
and international development interventions that are targeted to
their circumstances and unique needs.56
5.

Land Reform Responds to the Hierarchy of Human Needs

The pragmatic goals described thus far build progressively
one upon the other. At the first order, without basic food and
economic security, no other development goals are possible.
Second-order outcomes of access to the kinds of goods only
available to those with capital become possible through formal
titling, including improved housing, small business ownership,
55
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 14, § 2(g), opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
56
Lisa R. Pruitt, Deconstructing CEDAW’s Article 14: Naming and Explaining
Rural Difference, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 347, 352 (2011) (arguing that
Article 14 of CEDAW is “an example of rural exceptionalism” because it “moves
beyond the implicit focus on urban populations that characterizes a great deal of
contemporary law making”).
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and access to education. Third-order development of individual
capacity equips individuals with the skills and abilities they need
to pursue their own vision of the good, whatever that might be.
This kind of capacity-building changes communities for the
better, as they develop a critical mass of individuals dedicated to
and capable of improving the situation of the whole community.
And, finally, groups of individuals who have achieved a basic
modicum of economic well-being and are working to improve
their own communities in directed and focused ways have the
ability to help their nation achieve the kinds of development
goals that are the basis of the economic, social, and cultural
rights treaties.
This ordering of the pragmatic goals of land reform resonates
strongly with Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of needs, which
conceptualizes human development as occurring in a hierarchical
fashion.57 Starting with physiological needs, such as food and
water, Maslow theorized that once these baseline needs were
met, people could instead focus on physical safety and security,
then community, belonging, and affection, followed by esteem,
and ultimately self-actualization.58 These steps correlate closely
to the interconnected pragmatic goals just discussed. Food
security and income allow individuals to achieve this first level of
physiological needs. Titling of land provides intergenerational
security. Capacity-building serves ends of community, individual
esteem, and self-actualization for beneficiaries of land reform.
Achieving compliance with human rights goals accomplishes

57
A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 370
(1943).
58
Id. at 375–76, 380–82; see also Charles K. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods:
Intersections of Land Use Regulation, Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 799–800 (2012) (discussing Maslow’s theory in the context of
the provision of public goods and noting that “[m]unicipalities have not typically
been thought to be in the business of providing esteem and self-actualization, but in
fact they often do so without openly recognizing that goal”). Some legal scholars,
working in concert with labor organizers, have posited that cooperative work
models—similar to those found on collectively owned farms—can achieve at least the
first stages of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, though the transformative aspects are
not experienced by all involved. See Gowri J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation
as Progressive Lawyering? Moving Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 34
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 96 (2013).
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esteem and self-actualization for the nation as a whole in a
postcolonialist quest for identity and place in the world
community.59
Despite the potential for these many valuable outcomes,
while land reform can have a transformative effect on the lives of
its beneficiaries and the states in which they reside, it is not a
singular solution. Land reform, like other strategies to address
poverty, is expensive to implement. Although the international
community now has significant knowledge about what
approaches can reduce extreme poverty in the developing world,
the reality is that the lack of funds precludes nations from
actually eradicating poverty. Even if there were the political
will, the scarcity of land60 means that land reform cannot be the
route out of poverty for all poor persons. But these limitations on
what land reform can achieve does not discredit all land reform.
Rather, these limitations highlight the fact that land reform is
one of many development strategies that can be used in concert
to address global poverty.
B.

Expressive Goals of Land Reform

Beyond these practical purposes that land reform can
accomplish, nations can also initiate these programs to achieve
expressive goals. Expression may appear at first examination to
be an insufficient justification for initiatives that democratize
land access, easily dismissed as a vacuous, feel-good waste of
resources or mere propaganda designed to bolster support for an
embattled government. However, expression has a powerful role
in shaping the evolution of nations. Coupled with pragmatic
goals, expressive goals can demonstrate the advent of meaningful
changes in the culture of a nation. In its most aspirational form,
land reform can signal a shift towards a government that is more
responsive to and engaged with its own people; it can
demonstrate how the state’s resource allocation model is at least
partially dedicated to improving the conditions in which its
citizens live.

59

See infra Part I.B.
See Cavalieri, supra note 16 (discussing the role of the scarcity of land in
shaping land reform programs).
60
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Yet land reform that serves purely symbolic ends can
highlight the presence of a government that views corruption,
cronyism, and favoritism as legitimate government purposes and
that is willing to use redistributive efforts such as land reform to
prop up an otherwise struggling or illegitimate system.61 Where
land reform founded only on expressive goals bolsters an
otherwise threatened regime, it stands for an unjustified system
that undermines the democratic ends of land reform programs.
While this section articulates the array of expressive purposes
that land reform programs might serve, these goals only make
sense when coupled with pragmatic ones as well. Although
expressive goals of land reform can capture an important aspect
of the culture of land access, a program based on symbolism but
devoid of substance dedicated to improving the status of a
nation’s poorest citizens is fundamentally illegitimate. This
limitation on the role of expression does not, however, diminish
the importance of knowing what kinds of purposes land reform
can represent in the national imagination. Shared meaning has
long been an important aspect of legal and social change,62 and it
likewise can be in the context of land reform.
Many nations implement land reform as part of a
postcolonialist effort to broaden poor citizens’ access to arable
land.63 Whether independence has been achieved from rule of a

61

Although this set of traits is not unique to expropriation-based land
redistributions, transfers of expropriated land in gratitude for political patronage is
a well-documented phenomenon. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAST TRACK
LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 2 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302.pdf (describing “party-political control of
access to the forms for applying for land and partisan discrimination in the
allocation of plots” and “the key role of the [ruling political party] militias in
distributing and allocating land, [which are] the same militias that are responsible
for violence and intimidation against many who might otherwise apply for a plot”);
Andre Degeorges & Brian Reilly, Politicization of Land Reform in Zimbabwe:
Impacts on Wildlife, Food Production and the Economy, 64 INT’L J. ENVTL. STUD.
571, 574, 576 (2007) (noting that when Zimbabwe undertook its radical land reform
programs, it already possessed a great deal of land but failed in redistribution and
resettlement due to “cronyism, nepotism and corruption” and observing that “[m]uch
of the best land ha[d] ended in the hands of [ruling party] leaders and Government
officials, military officers and many leading judges”).
62
One example of this would be the role of the National Health Service in
solidifying British national identity after World War II. See Donald W. Light,
Universal Health Care: Lessons from the British Experience, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
25, 26 (2003).
63
WALKER ET AL., supra note 12.
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colonial government64 or a puppet government,65 in the
postcolonial context land reform signals a shift away from
colonialist values of resource extraction and depletion for the
enrichment of the colonizing nation. It demonstrates investment
in the provision of economic and material support to the citizens
of a nation. Prioritizing the use of national resources to eradicate
poverty and improve the lives of a nation’s own people is both a
practical and an emblematic change. Implementation of land
reform marks a moment where property as personhood ceases to
be a theory and becomes lived reality.66 Land reform after
independence signifies the aspiration of the nation to achieve a
more egalitarian state where wealth accrues to citizens instead of
foreigners.67
For land reform beneficiaries in this kind of a system,
ownership of land represents the deepest hopes of the poor to
have access to the stability that land signifies and a share of the
wealth they believe to be the promise of independence from
colonial powers.68 But it also captures the belief that farming the

64
In nations where colonial powers formally governed, independence involved
the formation of an autonomous government, though in the Zimbabwean case,
race-based rule did not fall until a later date. JOSEPH HANLON ET AL., ZIMBABWE
TAKES BACK ITS LAND 36 (2013).
65
In other instances, puppet governments were ostensibly comprised of citizens
who were controlled and shaped through colonial action. JIM HANDY, GIFT OF THE
DEVIL: A HISTORY OF GUATEMALA 85–88 (1984) (describing the relationship of
Guatemalan government to the United Fruit Company and the United States
government).
66
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
957–58 (1982); see also Cavalieri, supra note 16 (arguing that personhood might play
a robust role in shaping land reform initiatives).
67
For example, in Guatemala, coffee farms were traditionally operated by the
families of German immigrants that settled in the highlands and maintained large
plantations. Since the implementation of Fondo de Tierras, the most recent iteration
of Guatemalan land reform, many former farmworkers on those same plantations
are now purchasing the land. The identities of these new smallholders as farmers
coincides with their burgeoning identities as citizens of a postwar Guatemala, with
an elected government that does not commit rural genocide. In Zimbabwe, colonial
expropriation created tenure patterns where white farmers own large farms in
fertile areas, “while black rural dwellers barely subsist.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 61, at 4.
68
The scholarship on law and hope is growing, and land reform efforts fit
squarely as an example of what it means when legal systems not only resolve legal
wrongs but provide citizens with hope. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in
the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 319, 346–56, 363–71 (2007) (articulating
five elements of efforts to cultivate hope in others, including communicating
recognition and vision, allowing individuation, providing resources, supporting
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land involves a claim to the nation’s patrimony, that tilling soil is
an investment in the continued success and prosperity of the
nation.69 Land ownership and the personal investment of time,
sweat, and money into its cultivation is proof of social
citizenship.70
Individuals who work the land under
postcolonialist circumstances do so in part as a statement of
autonomy and dignity following years of struggle and oppression.
Land reform is imbued with expressive meaning, and not
only for the individual new land owner in postcolonialist nations;
it also has important expressive meaning for the nation itself. In
some instances, when land reform is implemented after years of
violence or government brutality,71 land reform can serve as a
form of reparations and provide a clear path forward—not as a
public airing of truth but as a form of reconciliation
nonetheless.72 Broadening access to land by government action is
concrete evidence of the postcolonial identity of the nation as
independent and capable of economic stability, aligning with a
shift towards national self-direction and agency as an actor in the
international arena. Land reform puts land in the hands of the
native peoples or their descendants in many countries and is a
manifestation of the nation’s self-reliance and capability
following years or perhaps centuries of external rule that
undermined these capacities. Democratizing land access and the
agency, and fostering solidarity, as well as identifying Head Start as a programmatic
effort that uses the law to cultivate hope).
69
This sense of place and belonging is not unique to the developing world. In
the United States, the century farm movement identifies and honors farmers who
can demonstrate that their farm has been in the family for at least 100 years. In
such instances, land ownership is not only about livelihood but also about identity, a
sense of place, and “honor[ing] a family’s multi-generational relationship with the
land.” Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s
Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 416 (2007).
70
The failed American postbellum promise of forty acres and a mule—land and
the materials necessary to work it—is still viewed by rural African Americans as
demonstrative of the refusal to grant the nation’s patrimony to freed formerly
enslaved persons. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community
Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 505–06,
530, 532 (2001).
71
Guatemala’s most recent land reform was founded as part of the 1996 Peace
Accords after a thirty-six-year civil war. SUSANNE JONAS, OF CENTAURS AND DOVES:
GUATEMALA’S PEACE PROCESS 11, 79–80 (2000). South Africa began a serious land
reform effort at the end of apartheid. WALKER ET AL., supra note 12.
72
See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 91–117 (1998)
(discussing the importance of reparations after mass human rights atrocities).
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intensive farming of arable land within a postcolonialist state
can also lead to complete food autonomy within a nation, or
realistic steps toward it, exhibiting the nation’s ability to care for
and increasingly sustain its own people without reliance on
external assistance.
Finally, from an international vantage point, land reform
can offer concrete evidence that the broad anti-poverty efforts of
transgovernmental organizations like the United Nations
Development Program73 and nongovernmental organizations like
the Gates Foundation74 are taking root. The work of these
organizations might be best viewed through a theoretical lens
such as the Capabilities Approach75 or from the vantage of
Rawlsian justice as fairness.76 They are dedicated to improving
the lot of the worst-off people in the world, though they do not
advocate a formal equity in distributing resources throughout
society.
The anti-poverty initiatives of these kinds of
organizations exhibit a broadening, worldwide commitment to
the eradication of extreme poverty and the reduction of poverty
overall.77 Nations making domestic commitments towards the
same goals demonstrate that the poorest countries in the world
are not merely beneficiaries of external international
development efforts, but are instead agents engaged in a shared
purpose of improving the standard of living of their poorest
citizens.
Of course, these expressive goals are not limitless in their
scope. That land is contextual and contingent78 suggests that it
will continue to mean different things to different people in
73
See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 40, at 3 (“[M]easures and
analytics are needed that broaden the human development concept. . . . [Human
development measures] must meet this challenge by moving beyond a focus on
measuring individual capabilities to incorporate society-level capacities, concerns
and perceptions. Individual achievements in health, education and income, while
essential, do not guarantee progress in human development if social conditions
constrain individual achievements . . . .”).
74
See
What
We
Do,
BILL
&
MELINDA
GATES
FOUNDATION,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
75
See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
76
See discussion infra Part II.B (considering how redistributive land reform
fares when analyzed under John Rawls’s approach to justice, articulated in his
seminal work, A Theory of Justice).
77
See A World of Development Experience, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html.
78
For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between land reform and
the contingent meaning of property, see Cavalieri, supra note 16.
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different places and times. Land reform thus can never bear only
one expressive meaning. But this should not preclude policymakers from contemplating what a land reform program can say
to all citizens of a nation in addition to what it can do for some
citizens of a nation. Indeed, it is possible that the expressive
message of land reform is broader in its impact within a nation
than the material effects of the reform. Respecting expressive
purposes thus remains an important consideration when shaping
a land reform initiative and can help analysts understand why a
particular program may succeed or fail.
II. MARKET-COMPATIBLE LAND REFORM PROGRAMS: A PRAGMATIC
LEVEL OF REDISTRIBUTION
Designed to democratize land access, redistributive land
reform necessarily involves land changing hands because these
programs are intended to increase the number of people with
rights to arable land.79 Land reform accomplishes its many
important goals80 by creating a new group of people with rights to
land. Critics of land reform decry these initiatives as wealth
redistribution, claiming that such efforts grossly overstep
permissible government actions.
But these critics assume
incorrectly that all reallocation of property is unjust. The
problem is the imprecision inherent in the term redistribution;
its meaning is imbued with contempt, but redistribution is a
common, even pedestrian, government function.81 At the heart of
this critique is the mistaken assumption that because some
redistribution of private property might go too far, all
redistribution is an unwarranted frustration of private property
rights.
This Article argues that redistributive land reform can be
compatible with the operation of a market for land, and
furthermore that it should be structured to avoid massive
disruption to the land market in order to most directly reduce the

79
It is of course possible to simply transfer land rights from one party to
another without increasing the number of people who have access to land. But this
kind of effort would not democratize access and, therefore, does not qualify as land
reform in the sense in which the term is used in this Article.
80
See supra Part I.
81
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 22–23
(2000).

FINAL_CAVALIERI

22

10/21/2015 4:59 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1

incidence of poverty in the nation. A market-compatible land
reform program avoids uncompensated state taking of private
property, but adopts as necessary compensated eminent domain
to achieve the public good of democratized access to land.82 While
uncompensated taking exceeds reasonable bounds because it
generates externalities that can undermine the goals of land
reform itself, the kinds of market-compatible land reform
programs that are the centerpiece of this Article strike an
appropriate balance, since states are concerned with, and at least
partially responsible for, the well-being of their people. This
Article focuses on land reform programs that avoid
uncompensated state taking of private property, which I refer to
as market-compatible land reform programs.
Although
uncompensated taking warrants its own detailed scholarly
consideration as a method by which states alter the system of
land ownership, this Article focuses explicitly on why land reform
programs designed to further development-based national and
international goals make sense. To that end, this Section briefly
defines expropriation in the context of land reform, explains how
expropriation runs the risk of undermining land reform as a
development initiative, and shows how market-compatible land
reform balances economic efficiency with the achievement of a
greater degree of equity in a nation.
To be clear, this Article does not idealize the land market as
the solution to problems of poverty. Rather, this Article argues
that if some market for land is accepted as a given in nations’
political arrangements, expropriation can cause economic
82
The distinction drawn here between market compatible land reform programs
and expropriation-based land reform programs differs from the distinctions
development scholars often draw among land reform initiatives. Their common
parlance refers to market-led agrarian reform which relies on market mechanisms to
provide land to landless people and only distributes “the land of landlords who
voluntarily sell . . . [. L]andlords who do not want to sell are not compelled to do so.”
BORRAS, supra note 7, at 54. Elsewhere, this kind of reform is called a willing-buyer,
willing-seller program. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6. In
contrast, state-led agrarian reform is coercive land reform in which landlords are
either unpaid for land taken or are paid at a below market price. See BORRAS, supra
note 7, at 58. However, this Article departs from this distinction, arguing instead
that the key for policymakers is to distinguish land reform programs that
compensate the landlord, which risk less economic destabilization, from land reform
programs based on uncompensated or undercompensated expropriation. Focusing on
the maintenance of stability as the key distinction among land reform programs is
an important contribution that the legal scholarship and its analysis of
expropriation can make to discussions of land reform.
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destabilization that disproportionately harms the poorest
citizens. This is neither a normative nor a philosophical critique
of expropriation, but a pragmatic one due to its consequences
under a certain set of circumstances. Thus, while this Article
argues that expropriation is problematic, this is a contextual and
consequentialist claim based upon expropriation’s ill effects in
the situation of a system of private property in land. One could
envision a different property system in which these consequences
would not accrue in the same fashion, but that is a different
project than the one that this Article undertakes. This Article
aims to show the most plausible route from the current market
for land to a robust program of land reform.
A.

Distinguishing Uncompensated Expropriation from
Compensated Eminent Domain

Expropriation is the government taking of private property.83
The term “expropriation” can be imprecise because it does not
clarify whether or not the government compensates the
landowner for the taken property.84 For the purposes of this
Article, the term “expropriation” is used to refer to takings that
occur without compensation. Land reform programs can be
based upon this kind of taking, whereby the state expropriates
the private property that will be involved in a land reform
initiative. Although the power of the sovereign to take property
has long been considered an inherent aspect of sovereignty,85
unjustified or uncompensated expropriation today violates the
83
“ ‘[E]xpropriation’ refers to an act by which governmental authority is used to
deny some benefit of property.” Barry Appleton, Regulatory Takings: The
International Law Perspective, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 40 (2002).
84
See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 28, at 672 (noting that “[o]utright expropriation
of property clearly requires compensation” in light of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause).
85
THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 3 (2d ed. 1984) (observing that any act of disloyalty to the throne
could lead to the loss of one’s land); see also William R. Vance, The Quest for Tenure
in the United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248, 270 (1924) (describing the powers of the
sovereign). Additionally, some exercises of government authority over private
property may serve goals other than land reform. For example, U.S. federal law
provides for the government to confiscate private property that has been used in
illegal drug transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012). The critique offered here of
expropriation is based purely on its use for accomplishing land reform goals in the
contemporary world and is neither a historical critique of the evolution of the
sovereign’s power of eminent domain nor a contemporary critique of other reasons
that a state might confiscate private property.
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domestic law of many nations86 and international human rights
norms.87 Under expropriation-based models of land reform, the
state seizes privately owned land while refusing to compensate
the owner; it can then redistribute the property by providing
another individual or group with title or access to the seized
land.88 In the absence of compensation, the state’s decision to
expropriate for land reform is simply a choice to exercise its
sovereign power in favor of certain kinds of owners over other
kinds of private owners without regard for making the prior
owners economically whole.
But expropriation is not the only way that the state can
obtain land for land reform when the market itself offers
insufficient property. The state can exercise its eminent domain
powers to compel individuals to sell their property to the state.
Both domestic and international legal systems have provided for
a model of justified and compensated eminent domain. Some
nations’ constitutions have defined permissible justifications for
the state’s exercise of eminent domain, such as public use89 or

86
For example, the U.S. Constitution provides that “private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Similarly, the Spanish Constitution provides that “[n]o one may be deprived of his or
her property and rights, except on justified grounds of public utility or social interest
and with a proper compensation in accordance with the law.” CONSTITUCIÓN
ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3.
87
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, art. 17, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“(1) Everyone has the right to own property
alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property.”); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27,
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 248 (“The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”); American
Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 150
(“(1) Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. (2) No one shall be
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms
established by law.”); Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S.
262 (entered into force May 18, 1954) (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law.”).
88
BORRAS, supra note 7, at 4. See discussion infra Part III, which considers
these various mechanisms of redistribution.
89
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
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public interest,90 and have required the payment of just91 or
fitting92 compensation as well. When land reform is based on this
kind of justified compensated exercise of eminent domain, the
state is again expressing a preference that land title or access be
provided to a new private owner instead of the prior owner. But
the government’s use of the eminent domain power to deprive
some owners of their property rights in order to bestow those
private property rights on others also includes an effort to make
the prior owner financially whole for the loss of the property; this
process recognizes and attempts to ameliorate the deprivation
that the prior owner suffers.93
B.

Why Expropriation-Based Land Reform Is Self-Defeating

While the unlawfulness of expropriation raises legitimate
legal concerns,94 for this discussion of land reform, expropriationbased land reform is most problematic because of the ways that it
undercuts the other key goals of land reform initiatives.95 Land
reform based on expropriation raises serious risks for nations
struggling to ensure basic livelihoods for their people, which
would include the bulk of countries interested or engaged in land
90
C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3 (Spain) (“No one may be
deprived of his or her property and rights, except on justified grounds of public
utility or social interest and with a proper compensation in accordance with the
law.”).
91
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92
C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3 (Spain).
93
Questions about the sufficiency of compensation can muddy this dichotomous
model. Challenges to the adequacy of compensation indicate that there is a conflict
about whether the taking is expropriation or an exercise of the state’s powers of
eminent domain. When the land allocated in land reform is acquired through
insufficiently compensated eminent domain actions, the resulting program is an
unfortunate hybrid of expropriation and government-initiated purchase through the
exercise of eminent domain. To the extent that insufficiently compensated eminent
domain actions raise the same problems as full-fledged expropriation, this type of
land reform warrants categorization as a less severe form of expropriation instead of
a market-compatible variety of land reform. The problems of expropriation are the
topic of the next Section.
94
See supra note 87 (discussing the variety of international human rights legal
norms and domestic laws that bar expropriation without justification or
compensation).
95
See supra Part I. It would also be possible to offer a noninstrumentalist
critique of expropriation which would challenge the state’s refusal to honor private
property rights, not just the negative externalities that expropriation generates. But
this approach is extrinsic to the current discussion which is focused on achieving the
goals of land reform and international development, not on a broader critique of
government takings of private property.
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reform initiatives.96 Expropriation provokes individuals’ and
businesses’ fears of the complete loss of private property to the
state. As a result, land reform based on expropriation can
threaten efforts to encourage outside investment in a nation, as
private investors are far less likely to begin the kinds of ventures
that would create economic growth and jobs.97 In the absence of
security of ownership against government expropriation,
purchases of real property can be viewed as an irrational
economic act that few individuals or businesses would be willing
to undertake.98 Without maintaining confidence that the market
for land will remain reasonably steady and stable, the looming
threat of uncompensated expropriation can lead to dramatic
social upheaval, which benefits neither pre-existing landowners,
beneficiaries of the land reform program, nor other poor citizens
in the nation in question.
The American property law doctrine of marketability of title
helps elucidate this economic reality. The central term of any
American land contract is the clause in which the seller warrants
that he or she will convey “good and marketable title” to the
buyer. Marketable title is “a title that is reasonably free from
such doubts as will affect the market value of the estate; one
which a reasonably prudent person with knowledge of all the
facts and their legal bearing would be willing to accept.”99 In the
American property system, it is typically viewed as the central
term of the land contract, such that the failure of the seller to
convey good and marketable title provides the buyer the right to
rescind the land contract, among other remedies.100 The key
insight that the doctrine of marketable title highlights is that
most property owners prefer land that does not invite litigation

96
The problems discussed in this Section are an accurate portrayal of the
destabilizing forces of expropriation in the context of a nation with a relatively free
market for land. Importantly, this kind of property regime is not the only plausible
system of ownership and titling of land. A nation could embrace a land tenure
system based upon state-held title and long-term grants of access to individuals
without providing for private, alienable title to real property.
97
Bernadette Atuahene, Property Rights & the Demands of Transformation, 31
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 765, 771–72 (2010).
98
See id. at 814.
99
DAVID A. THOMAS, 11-91 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.09(a)(1)
(Thomas Ed. 2013).
100
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 776 (3d
ed. 2000).
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or the possibility of the loss of the property.101 Expropriation
raises similar risks, not that title will be challenged by a private
owner with a paramount claim, but that the state will assert its
right over the property without making the owner whole. The
threat of expropriation thus tarnishes all land transfers, insofar
as all land in an expropriating nation is held cognizant of the real
possibility that the land may be lost.102 Where this fear is
pervasive, it depresses land prices and affects how landholders
use their property as well.
Even the looming specter of expropriation thus functions to
undermine land’s marketability, in the doctrinal sense,
generating an array of negative concomitant consequences for the
land market and the entire economy. Demand for property can
decline due to the reluctance of potential buyers to make
purchases they perceive as risky. This drop in demand can be so
precipitous as to threaten the operation of a market for the sale
and purchase of real property.103
Without prices being
maintained through continued demand for property, the market
for real property essentially disappears, rendering the land itself
largely devoid of market value.104 These consequences accrue to
all landowners, both those who held land prior to the land reform
and those who were the beneficiaries of the land reform.
Diminution in the value of land not only affects the present
operation of the market for land purchases, but also can alter
how long-term landowners invest in and maintain their

101
India’s 2008 land titling law attempted to account for the issue of security
and marketability of title by building into conclusive titles a title guarantee that
“indemnif[ies] the property holder against any losses that may result from
inaccuracies” in the title system. Sinha, supra note 25, at 20.
102
Precious Zikhali, Fast Track Land Reform Programme, Tenure Security and
Investments in Soil Conservation: Micro-Evidence from Mazowe District in
Zimbabwe, 34 NAT. RESOURCES F. 124, 135 (2010) (comparing perceptions of security
of tenure of smallholders who received their land through expropriation and who
held their land based on traditional communal land holdings and observing that
those who benefited from expropriation believed their own tenure to be far less
secure).
103
Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role
and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1551–52
(2011) (discussing the decline in capital in the U.S. housing market).
104
See ROBERT B. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 30–33 (4th
ed. 2004). Notably, land in a title-insecure nation retains other kinds of value,
discussed supra in Part I.A., including its crucial role as a contributor to food
security.
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property.105 Where expropriation is a threat, owners fear the
inability to recoup their ongoing reinvestments in the upkeep of
their land; they therefore will lack one of the primary motives to
continue improving the condition of their property.106 Even the
recipients of expropriated land have been shown to question
whether their title is stable in a nation that legitimates
expropriation.107 Both long-term owners and beneficiaries of land
reform might wish to mortgage their property in order to obtain
capital, either to improve the property or to pursue other goals,108
but the threat of a pervasive decline in the land market can
freeze the availability of loans secured by private property.109

105
Economists have posited three distinct ways that land rights are linked to
investment. First, individuals do not invest if they fear their investments will be
seized by others. Second, more stable rights make land easier to use as collateral to
fund improvements. Third, stable rights to alienate property encourage investments.
See Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and
Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903, 906–07 (1995); see also Zikhali, supra
note 102, at 124–25 (describing these three models as the “security argument,” the
“collateral-based view,” and the “gains-from-trade perspective”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the United States, one key factor that led to the decline in
investment following the housing crash was the reduction of funds available through
home equity lines of credit due to the loss of property value. Thomas J. Cunningham
et al., Litigation Over the Reduction of Home Equity Lines of Credit: Hickman and
Beyond, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 35, 35 (2010).
106
See Nick Dancaescu, Note, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L.
615, 635 (2003) (“The consequence of attacking a minority . . . may inadvertently be
that all citizens with property rights ask: what is to stop the government from
seizing my land? With this fear in their minds, people are less likely to invest capital
or even sweat equity into the land if their interest is de facto unsecured. Simply put,
insecurity in land discourages investment in that land, and leads to a meltdown of
the agribusiness section of a country, and the economy.”). Following the passage of
laws permitting the government to confiscate lands, set land prices, and prevent
appeals of compensation paid, MARTIN MEREDITH, MUGABE: POWER AND PLUNDER
IN ZIMBABWE 122 (2002), one farmer noted, “Farming is a long-term business. If I
can't be sure that I will still have my land in five to ten years, why should I waste
my time and money on it?” RUTH WEISS, ZIMBABWE AND THE NEW ELITE 192 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
107
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 2 (“Even those people allocated
plots on former commercial farms appear in many cases to have little security of
tenure on the land, leaving them vulnerable to future partisan political processes or
eviction on political grounds, and further impoverishment.”).
108
DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 48.
109
Ernest Aryeetey & Christopher Udry, Creating Property Rights: Land Banks
in Ghana, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 130, 130 (2010) (“Insecure property rights reduce the
ability of borrowers to pledge land as collateral and thus tighten credit
constraints.”). This reality is not limited to the land reform context. Where the value
of property is dropping, loans secured by real property become less available, as seen
in the United States during the Great Recession. Not only was it increasingly
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Instead of increasing economic equality by raising the relative
position of landless rural people, expropriation-based land reform
thus can undermine the entirety of a nation’s economy,
threatening the economic stability of individuals in all
socioeconomic strata.110
Some scholars suggest that these consequences of instability
are minimized because the benefits of expropriation accrue to the
most vulnerable who receive the expropriated land;111 this
approach considers the losses suffered by wealthy individuals to
be a legitimate means to provide land access for poor people. But
this presumption misapprehends how widespread destabilization
differentially affects members of different social classes. In
reality, the wealthy often have the resources to ride out the social
and economic disruptions that expropriation causes.
The
destabilizing collateral effects of expropriation disproportionately
harm the individuals who are the beneficiaries of the land reform
program. If the central goal of land reform is to provide land to
the rural poor as a means of improving those individuals’
economic positions and increasing social equality in the state,112
expropriation devalues the very resource that has been
transferred to the formerly landless. In so doing, expropriation

difficult for buyers to obtain purchase-money loans, the availability of home equity
lines of credit likewise decreased. Cunningham et al., supra note 105.
110
In Zimbabwe, many of the farms in the most productive agricultural zones of
the country lie fallow because of the inexperience of the land reform beneficiaries,
unwillingness to invest in agriculture at a time of hyperinflation, costs of fertilizers
and diesel, machinery shortages, and departures of experienced farm managers for
higher wages. These facts, combined with a twenty-five percent HIV/AIDS infection
rate in the working-age population, now mean that Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket
of Africa, is struggling to feed its youngest and oldest, who cannot work. See
Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 577, 579.
111
Tom Lebert, An Introduction to Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe, in
PROMISED LAND: COMPETING VISIONS OF AGRARIAN REFORM 40, 54 (Peter Rosset et
al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter PROMISED LAND].
112
Notably, this is not consistently the goal of land reform, particularly land
reforms conducted for nonpragmatic reasons. In some instances, land reform is
really a mask for gifts based on political patronage, whereby a party or individual in
power takes land from members of the opposition, or perhaps persons simply
uninvolved in the political process, and transfers it to supporters of the party. In
other situations, the entire expressive purpose of the purported land reform is to
show the Robin Hood-esque bona fides of the government, taking from the rich
without compensation and giving to the poor. In still other situations, the
government might make a show of force against either individuals or business
interests, demonstrating its own power through its ability to deprive owners of their
rights to their own property.
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therefore undermines one central purpose of the land reform
program itself: offering the advantages of land ownership to
previously poor individuals.113 Crucial benefits to the new
landowner, such as the ability to borrow against valuable
property, are lost when expropriation leads to fundamental
devaluation of land.114
Destabilization not only harms landowners, it also causes
grave consequences for other poor persons in the nation. In
many instances, where expropriation reduces investment in and
cultivation of land,115 food production also decreases, driving up
food prices and threatening food security within a nation.116
Although land reform beneficiaries often cultivate their own
subsistence crops and may not experience hunger as a result of
the destabilization, expropriation-based land reform can harm
both the urban and rural poor of a nation who are not the
recipients of the redistributed land, risking greater overall
poverty and food insecurity as a cost of the reform.117 Again,
wealthy individuals have access to sufficient private resources to

113

See supra Part I.A (discussing this range of benefits).
As highlighted earlier in Part I.A.2, one of the benefits of land reform can be
the fact that a title to property provides collateral against which a family might
borrow, offering a source of capital to previously poor individuals. DE SOTO, supra
note 5, at 48, 216. Yet even if this benefit of land reform is lost as a consequence of
expropriation, food security goals can often still be realized.
115
See Dancaescu, supra note 106; Besley, supra note 105, at 906.
116
By 2007, following the implementation of widespread expropriation based
land reform, annual inflation in Zimbabwe reached two thousand two hundred
percent, and food production was approximately sixty-five percent below food needs
for the country and thirty-four percent below average production from the prior
decade. Due to inflation, what little food was available in the food markets was
priced out of reach for even the average family, and twenty-five percent of
Zimbabwe’s population was receiving food aid from the United Nations, though this
aid was at times preferentially distributed as a form of political favoritism for
Mugabe’s supporters. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 579.
117
See id. (noting that inflation rendered food unaffordable for the average
family, not just the very poorest); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61
(describing how farm workers have been generally excluded from the benefits of land
redistribution); Medicine Masiiwa, The Fast Track Resettlement Programme in
Zimbabwe: Disparity Between Policy Design and Implementation, 94 ROUND TABLE
217, 221–22 (2005) (documenting massive unemployment following Zimbabwe’s
expropriation-based Fast Track Resettlement Programme because many farms
stopped hiring farm workers).
114
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avoid the worst consequences of this destabilization, whether by
leaving the country or by spending private funds to smooth over
the most serious effects to the household economy.118
To the extent that land reform often, but not always,
represents one facet of a more general effort towards
democratization of formerly dictatorial or colonialist regimes,
expropriation also contravenes the underlying value of individual
human rights within the nation.119 Where land reform is
conducted via expropriation, it can still democratize land access
by broadening the class of landowners to include poor landless
individuals as well as traditional elites, but through
undemocratic means.120 In a postcolonial nation that may
struggle to enact the democratic rule of law, expropriation
threatens democratic progress in the name of economic
equality.121 As land reform ideally reflects a shift toward
democracy, the rejection of individual rights that is inherent in
expropriation can undermine democratic evolution.

118

Political violence has been documented as one consequence of certain models
of expropriation. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 10. This differential
ability to respond to social instability is not just about land reform and
expropriation. Worldwide, poor people lack the resources to care for their families
when society is upended while their wealthier counterparts can use their own
wealth to avoid the worst effects of unrest. The crisis situation in Syria presented
one obvious example of this, whereby wealthy Syrians escaped before the sieges
began, and the poorest were those trapped by warfare. Ruth Sherlock & Carol
Malouf, Rich Refugees Pay Thousands To Flee War-Torn Syria in Luxury,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:28 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/syria/10450787/Rich-refugees-pay-thousands-to-flee-war-tornSyria-in-luxury.html.
119
It is for this reason that human rights conventions protect property rights.
See supra note 87 (identifying various human rights treaties that enshrine some
protection of the individual’s right to own property).
120
In Zimbabwe, the earliest forms of postindependence land reform in the
1980s provided land to the black elite, including ministers, members of parliament,
senior civil servants, and police and defense officials, who received eight percent of
the commercial farmland in the country. By 2000, only 75,000 black families had
been resettled on land reform lands out of a total black population of approximately
twelve million. Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 574–75.
121
The recent thrust of development efforts has shifted away from demands for
redistribution, including radical or extensive land reform, and towards governance
questions. See Moyo, supra note 14, at 197. To the extent that this shift is a real
change in development priorities, perceptions that land reform undermines
governance and democratization goals may lessen the already scant support
available for these programs.
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Nevertheless, expropriation still has its supporters. Many
scholars concerned with the problem of rural poverty in the
developing world reject the notion of market-compatible land
reform because it is insufficiently aggressive in addressing
inequality.122 Instead, they consider expropriation to be the only
viable source of adequate quantities of land to make a
meaningful difference in the lives of landless peasants.123 Such
advocates of expropriation focus on the urgent pursuit of a more
robust equality and are not concerned about the loss of property
by the wealthy or with the consequences of expropriation; they
seek a revolutionary approach to alter land tenure patterns.
While this Article is sympathetic to the goal of poverty reduction,
its aspiration is not to design a new market system for land.
Rather, its purpose is to articulate the benefits of land reform
and lay out a broadly palatable approach for realizing those
benefits soon. As a result, this Article adopts a pragmatic
orientation toward the land market and accepts that it will
continue; the Article thus seeks to overcome the worst of rural
poverty under current market conditions.
A philosophical examination of this principled demand for a
more robust model of equality in the distribution of land,
accomplished through expropriation, also evidences exactly how
expropriation achieves the wrong balance under current market
conditions.
Beyond the practical problems just discussed,
application of John Rawls’s difference principle likewise shows
why the instability that differentially harms those at the bottom
of the socioeconomic hierarchy makes expropriation an
unjustifiable option. Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness does
not require formal equality, so long as any inequality does not
merely improve the social lot of those in privilege, but also
improves the situation of the least well-off.124 Rawls undoubtedly
preferred equality, so long as it actually improved the lives of the

122
This was the situation that led to expropriation in Zimbabwe, where first
generation reforms, requiring willing buyers and willing sellers, and second
generation reforms, mandating the payment of compensation calculated apart from
market forces, did not generate sufficient land to provide to poor people. As a result,
the Fast Track Resettlement Program shifted to a model that did not require
compensation for seized land. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6.
123
See Saturnino M. Borras, Jr., The Underlying Assumptions, Theory, and
Practice of Neoliberal Land Policies, in PROMISED LAND, supra note 111, at 99, 114.
124
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (rev. ed. 1999) (rejecting aggregate
well-being as the measure of justice).
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poor.125 But he was concerned that efforts toward formal equality
would reduce the total well-being of society,126 thereby further
harming those lacking privilege.127 According to his theory,
“inequality . . . is permissible only if lowering it would make the
working class even more worse off.”128 Not all land reform is
equal if Rawlsian justice is the goal, because while formal
equality of outcome is not necessary, the program must advance
the position of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
A Rawlsian framework for land reform, therefore, reveals
important distinctions among different modes of land reform. A
land reform program need not mandate a formally equal
distribution of land divided evenly among all citizens, or even
undertake a widespread redistribution, to satisfy the difference
principle.129 In fact, such approaches may violate the difference
principle if those at the bottom of the hierarchy are rendered
relatively better off, in comparison to their privileged
counterparts, but also absolutely worse off, because the amount
of wealth or privilege available to poor persons has been
diminished or because the general state of society has changed to
the detriment of the poor.130 A land reform program must,
therefore, not only improve the relative position of the poor at the
bottom of the hierarchy, closing the gap between the rich and the
poor; it must also improve their absolute position in terms of
their overall well-being.
125

Id. (“It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order
that others may prosper.”).
126
Economists in general have been skeptical of the value of redistribution
because of its potential inefficiency. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975). But recent scholarship has suggested that
equality may have an important role in driving higher and more sustainable growth.
See generally Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth, INT’L
MONETARY FUND STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE, Feb. 2014, at 1.
127
RAWLS, supra note 124, at 67–69.
128
Id. at 68.
129
See id.
130
This is not a purely philosophical point. The United Nations Development
Program (“UNDP”) has rejected the standard development approach which it
describes as “focused on getting economic fundamentals right as a precondition for
economic growth, [and] arguing that other human development improvements would
follow.” UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 40, at 69. In contrast, it
advocates “[a] human development approach . . . [which] demands that improvement
in poor people’s lives not be postponed.” Id. Thus, the UNDP also appears to be
concerned about the distribution of growth, not merely the fact of growth’s
occurrence, and focused on improving poor people’s lives while economic growth
happens.
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This is another version of the concern about the destabilizing
effects of expropriation. Expropriation appears, on the face of it,
to improve the lot of the poor by providing them with land. But
the resulting instability not only threatens the well-being of the
beneficiaries of the land reform program,131 but also the lot of the
other poor members of society, including the urban poor.132
Application of the Rawlsian difference principle, which allows for
continued inequality if its elimination would worsen the
conditions of life for those at the bottom of the social structure,
indicates that there are good reasons of justice, not merely
expediency, to avoid undermining the stability of the economic
system on the whole. A Rawlsian approach to land reform,
therefore, cannot countenance rampant expropriation because
the negative consequences of the resulting social instability
would most onerously affect the very poorest in a nation.133 But
note also that this concern with stability should always favor a
situation in which the system “maximize[s] the expectations of
those most disadvantaged.”134 To this end, stability is not a goal
because the status quo maintains the social position of wealthy
land owners. Rather, stability is an acceptable goal only to the
extent that it prevents even worse harm from accruing to the
most disadvantaged in the nation. Land reform may disrupt the
existing hierarchy insofar as it “maximize[s] the expectations of
those most disadvantaged”;135 it becomes problematic if it causes
destabilization so extensive that it renders them worse off.
C.

Market-Compatible Land Reform Balances Land-Reform
Goals and Economic Stability

For these many reasons, both practical and philosophical,
expropriation-based land reform goes too far in its redistributive
efforts. Due to these problems that result from expropriation,
this Article focuses instead on land reform efforts conducted
through market-compatible mechanisms, which this Article
131

Masiiwa, supra note 117 (documenting that the local currency sharply
depreciated and inflation sharply increased following the expropriation based Fast
Track Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe).
132
Id. at 221 (documenting that following the expropriation based Fast Track
Resettlement Programme, the resulting decline in agricultural production led to a
substantial increase in food shortages in Zimbabwe).
133
RAWLS, supra note 124, at 68.
134
Id. at 70.
135
Id.
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defines as those based on methods consistent with the stable
operation of a market for land within the nation. The key
characteristic of a market-compatible land reform is that the
uncompensated loss of private property is not the source of the
land that is subject to redistribution.
Avoiding expropriation is crucial because market-compatible
land reform is far more likely to maintain a critical level of social
stability, in which individuals and businesses remain willing to
invest in land because they do not fear that the government will
take it for the government’s own ends. Market-compatible land
reform allows the beneficiaries of a land reform effort security in
their right to land in the foreseeable future, thereby increasing
their willingness to expend the money and effort to improve their
land. The resulting social stability benefits current landowners
and the beneficiaries of land reform, as just described, as well as
poor persons outside of the land reform system whose lives are
not disrupted by social upheaval.
A land reform initiative that values the maintenance of
stability in the land market would be predicated on either private
sales, whether subsidized or not, or the state’s exercise of
compensated eminent domain.
Under market-compatible
conditions, localities, regions, or nations that decide to
implement land reform are making a fundamentally rational
economic decision based on careful cost-benefit analysis. In the
instance of a private transaction facilitated by the state, the land
reform beneficiary will only decide to buy if the benefits of land
rights are worth the price paid.136 If the buyer’s purchase is
subsidized by the state, then the state is making a calculation
that the reform’s benefits to the state are worth the cost of
paying the subsidy for the property.137 If the state is the
purchaser, with the intention of giving land to beneficiaries, then
again, the state is determining that the purchase is worthwhile.

136

See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of these mechanisms of land

reform.
137
This model raises some questions because it shields the land reform
beneficiary, who may put up part of the money, from the complete cost of the
decision to acquire the property. Under these facts, such a buyer may be insulated
from making a thorough cost-benefit analysis since the buyer does not contemplate
the entire price of the property when deciding whether to purchase it only partially
with personal resources. This is not a strong argument against subsidizing land
reform programs but rather a simple observation of one of its potential downsides.
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As described above, only in a relatively stable market will buyers
be willing to invest their money in land—this is the key insight
that animates the doctrine regarding the marketability of title.
The allocation of the benefits and harms of land reform is
one of the key reasons why a market-compatible approach is a far
more desirable means to achieve the goals of land reform138 than
an expropriation-based approach. Expropriation decouples the
risks of governmental takings of property from the benefits of
those actions. Where expropriation drives land reform, the
myriad benefits of land reform accrue to the recipients of the
land, who do not suffer an immediate loss, and to the state,
which gains a measure of populist credibility. But under these
same circumstances, neither the beneficiaries of the land reform
nor the state put any financial skin in the game. Instead of
spending either the beneficiaries’ private financial resources or
funds from the public fisc to obtain land for transfer, the costs of
the land reform are all borne by the owner whose property the
state expropriated while the benefits remain with the recipient
and the state. This can make land reform appear peculiarly
attractive to the state, since under these circumstances it only
stands to benefit from a program on which it expends no state
funds.
In contrast, market-compatible land reform unifies the
benefits and risks of land reform in the same parties. In
market-compatible land reform, land is obtained by either a
private group of individuals purchasing the land for their own
use, the government purchasing the land to distribute to citizens
through gift or purchase, or a hybrid purchase funded jointly by
the beneficiaries and the state. In any of these cases, the prior
owner is compensated. Consequently, the purchaser must decide
whether the best use of the available funds is to purchase land,
or for other possible uses. The land reform should only occur
where the purchasers view the benefits of the purchase as
meeting or exceeding the cost of obtaining the land. If the
potential benefits of the land reform do not meet or exceed the
actual monetary costs of implementation, it thereby follows that
the purchase should not occur.139
138

See supra Part I for an exhaustive discussion of the goals of land reform.
Land reform also might create sufficient positive externalities that the state
could encourage and support the purchases, even if the private benefit to the
beneficiary is less than the purchase price. Much like domestic investments in Head
139
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This is of course the economically rational course of action
which may not be followed as people and states are not perfectly
rational actors.140 But even if an irrational purchase is made
without a clear cost-benefit analysis—such as where the state
and the beneficiary each pay part of the cost so neither conducts
a complete cost-benefit analysis—it does not decouple the
benefits and the harms of the conveyance. The risks and benefits
are still unified in the state and the beneficiary, both of whom
pay some money and achieve some of their goals. As a result,
though poorly designed programs may still exist, by avoiding
expropriation, the appearance of costlessness will not encourage
the state to take private property.
But the most legally interesting land reform scenario occurs
when the land reform program suffers for want of land to
distribute, usually because the owners of property appropriate
for redistribution do not wish to sell their land. In such
moments, one option would be for the state to simply postpone
land reform, deferring to the desires of private owners to decide
whether they want to sell or not. This can undermine the
purposes of a land reform effort.141 The other primary option
would be for the state to conclude that privately owned land
should be distributed in contravention of the wishes of the
individual owner who does not wish to sell. This outcome could
be accomplished by expropriation, but for the reasons explored
above, the preferable alternative that maintains economic
stability is for the state to exercise its eminent domain powers
against a landowner who is unwilling to sell. Again, that the
state or beneficiaries must pay money means they bear both the
risk and the benefit, reducing the likelihood of unwarranted risktaking. The key question is how such a transaction can be
structured in a market-compatible fashion that does not
destabilize the land market specifically and the economy
generally.
Start, for example, which generate substantial returns on investment throughout
the lives of children who participate, land reform may similarly generate returns
over a long period of time.
140
The basic presumption of economics is that all actors behave in an
economically rational fashion. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 104, at 3. This
presumption has of course been broadly critiqued.
141
To the extent the program is based upon the desire of the state to accomplish
the goals set out in Part I, the failure to obtain sufficient land for the program can
frustrate a valuable purpose.
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D. Eminent Domain Jurisprudence Generates
Market-Compatible Land Reform
The market-compatible land reform proposed here is rooted
in a variety of existing eminent domain frameworks.
International human rights norms’ approaches to protecting
private property rights against the state’s exercise of eminent
domain are fashioned to try to reach this outcome. The American
Convention on Human Rights strikes this balance by providing
that while individuals have “the right to the use and enjoyment”
of their property, “[t]he law may subordinate such use and
enjoyment to the interest of society.”142
However, this
subordination can only occur under specific circumstances. First,
the taking must be reimbursed by the “payment of just
compensation.”143 Second, the taking must be justified as serving
“public utility or social interest.”144 Third, the deprivation must
be done “in the cases and according to the forms established by
law.”145
Likewise, domestic laws of various nations require that
takings must be compensated and justified as well. The Spanish
Constitution seeks a similar equilibrium by requiring takings to
be justified on “grounds of public utility or social interest and
with a proper compensation in accordance with the . . . law.”146
The U.S. Constitution also offers its own analogous approach
requiring justification and compensation. The Fifth Amendment
takings doctrine states that the government shall not take
private property except for public use. 147 Even when the public
use rule is satisfied, the government still must provide just
compensation to the owner whose land has been taken.148
Understanding the operation of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence offers an example of how market-compatible land
reform options strike their careful economic balance. The state
must justify its exercise of eminent domain as serving a public
use, which is defined broadly as a use validated by the legislature

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 87.
Id. art. 21(2).
Id.
Id.
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 33, § 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
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as serving the good of the general public.149
The just
compensation requirement obligates the government to pay the
fair market value of the taken property, which in theory is the
same as what the private owner would have received had the
property been sold on the private market.150
The Fifth
Amendment, therefore, sets up a process in which the
government must actually decide whether the expenditure of
funds on land is a worthwhile use of public monies to serve the
good of the public, as compared to other possible uses of the same
funds. To the extent that the public fisc is not bottomless,
economic reality will always limit the kinds of takings that the
government can realistically pursue, even for properly
articulated public uses.
The United States Supreme Court’s only land reform case
suggests how this model of justified, compensated eminent
domain as the source of property for land reform plays out in
practice.151 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,152 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a land reform initiative in Hawaii that
permitted condemnations and transfers of ownership of
residential property from landlords to tenants “in order to reduce
the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State.”153
The Court determined that this kind of land reform satisfied the
public use doctrine because through this program, “[t]he people of
Hawaii . . . attempted . . . to reduce the perceived social and
economic evils of a land oligopoly.”154 In so holding, the Court
concluded that this program did not merely further the interests
149
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1954); see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (noting that this definition is expansive and highly
deferential to the legislature) (“The ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”).
150
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (stating that fair market
value means that the owner should be paid “what a willing buyer would pay in cash
to a willing seller”). But see United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S.
121, 123 (1950) (“[W]hen market value has been too difficult to find, or when its
application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have
fashioned and applied other standards.”).
151
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 230–31.
152
467 U.S. 229.
153
See id. at 231–32, 241–42.
154
Id. at 241–42; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503
U.S. 407, 422 (1992) (citations omitted) (citing Midkiff approvingly for holding that
transferring ownership of land from one private party to another in order to reduce
the oligarchic control of property satisfies the public use requirement of the Takings
Clause).
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of some individuals, but accomplished a social good by reducing
the harms of oligopoly, even though the state conveyed the land
from one private individual to another.155
Further consideration of Midkiff reveals how land reform
can satisfy the conditions of market-compatibility. Exercising
eminent domain over property for a public use justifiable under
the Fifth Amendment is only a rational state action if the
benefits from the taking are worth the amount of the obligatory
just compensation that must be paid for such a program to
survive constitutional scrutiny. Because the government must
pay to exercise eminent domain, it only does so if the land reform
is a worthwhile public policy action as compared to competing
government priorities. This is about more than the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—it is also about all other
market-compatible land reforms in other countries. The same
economic reality should logically control whether those nations
undertake market-compatible land reform, even if their
constitutions do not require this approach. If the government
wishes to obtain land to do land reform and hopes to avoid
destabilizing the economy, but the open market lacks the
necessary property, it needs to compensate the prior owners
rather than expropriating land to redistribute. When it does so,
the government is making a fundamentally rational economic
decision; the government only does this after performing a
cost-benefit analysis in which the nation considers whether it is
worth spending public monies to dismantle the concentration of
land in the hands of relatively few people.156
As a result, market-compatible land reform differs
significantly from the uncompensated land seizures that typify
expropriation. For market-based land reform to occur, the
government makes a public decision that the financial hit to the
public fisc is a worthwhile investment of public resources, a
private actor performs the same calculus, or both decide to act
and expend resources in a cooperative purchase. This suggests

155

See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42.
The only residual question is the justification process. Without having a legal
obligation to justify the purchase for the good of the public, it is possible that the
state could choose to obtain land for purposes that are unjustified from a democratic
standpoint. However, this is a problem for compensated eminent domain in general,
not just for land reform. Land reform designed to destroy oligopoly is justified on
this basis, as the U.S. Supreme Court found in Midkiff. See id.
156
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that there is a substantial difference between the kinds of
expropriation that create public alarm and market-compatible
reform that provides opportunities for citizens to become
small-scale landowners while still maintaining economic
stability.
E.

Market-Compatible Land Reform Is Consistent with Central
Government Functions

The primary remaining critique of the kinds of land reform
programs here espoused is that these more modest,
market-compatible approaches still go too far. Even the kind of
land reform programs central to this Article have been criticized
as instances of excessive government intervention that come too
close to functioning as uncompensated taking of private
resources for public purposes157—in essence, as a form of
redistribution that goes too far, much like expropriation is
redistribution that goes too far.158
The reality is that redistribution is one of the primary
functions of the modern nation. While such programs are the
subject of critique by those who reject the idea of taxing some
citizens to provide for the needs of others,159 they are extremely
common and can be viewed as part of a nation’s effort to ensure a
basic quality of life to its people.160 Public resources are used
worldwide to provide for education, health care, food, and income
for individuals who cannot provide these necessities for
themselves; these goods are the substance of essential human
rights to which most countries have agreed their citizens are
entitled.161 Taxation to support any public good is, after all,
redistribution. Tax-supported standing armies provide for the
public good of national defense; tax-supported diplomatic corps

157
M. RIAD EL-GHONEMY, THE CRISIS OF RURAL POVERTY AND HUNGER 30–31
(2007) (discussing sources of neoliberal critique of redistributionary land reform
programs).
158
See id.
159
See id.
160
See Fineman, supra note 81.
161
See Helen Clark, Foreword to UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra
note 40, at iv (“[E]conomic growth alone does not automatically translate into
human development progress. Pro-poor policies and significant investments in
people’s capabilities—through a focus on education, nutrition and health, and
employment skills—can expand access to decent work and provide for sustained
progress.”). See generally ICESCR, supra note 47.
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provide for the public good of international negotiation and
conflict resolution. Such functions are redistributive; without
taxation to support them, the wealthy could privately finance
defense or diplomacy, and the poor and middle classes would be
left without these services. Although some might assert that
there is a difference between redistribution to allocate greater
resources to some private interest and redistribution to allocate
funds to a public good, whenever the former involves achieving
positive externalities for the whole of society, it becomes a public
good. Such is the case for market-compatible land reform.
The purpose of this Article is not to offer a defense of the
modern welfare state. But to the extent that the other linchpins
of the modern welfare state are considered to be legitimate, this
Article argues that land reform properly deserves a place with
other widely accepted social insurance and support programs. If
one accepts redistribution for goods, such as education, food, or
health care, or of the proceeds of taxation through national
defense, it is illogical to reject redistributive efforts whose
beneficiaries receive land, provided that the redistribution of the
land reform does not go too far, which is avoided in the model
just described.
III. THE MANY FORMS OF CONTEMPORARY LAND REFORM
PROGRAMS
Redistributive aspects of land reform programs typically
serve to democratize access to the agricultural lands of a country,
by providing land rights to previously landless individuals or
groups. Yet that this Article has thus far focused on arguing for
the validity and usefulness of a market-compatible redistributive
land reform masks the fact that such reforms can take myriad
shapes. It further hides important distinctions among land
reform programs that may be connected to their ultimate success
or failure. Building a typology of market-compatible land reform
initiatives accomplishes two main ends. It offers clarification of
the robustness of the market-compatible model, which is not a
one-size-fits-all policy approach, but rather a wide array of
possible adaptations of a program to meet government mandate
and national need in states around the world. Additionally, it
suggests that those working to initiate a land reform initiative
can shape its future success by customizing the program within
the umbrella of market-compatibility.
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The characteristics of such programs can be mapped along
four central axes. First, programs can vary according to the
means by which land rights are transferred to a new party via
gift or purchase. Second, land reform programs differ based on
whether the right created is access or title to land. Third, the
beneficiaries can hold this right individually or collectively.
Fourth, the state can play an array of different roles in
facilitating the transfer of land. Each of these dimensions is
continuous, rather than binary—in other words, a particular land
reform program could be situated, relative to other programs, on
each measure according to its key characteristics.
The
combination of these four factors produces a fairly comprehensive
operational description of a land reform program. The level of
public support for a particular land reform and, relatedly, the
possibility of controversy surrounding it, and potentially
undermining its success, correspond to these central traits of
land reform programs.
A.

Beneficiaries Can Receive Land Rights by Gift or Purchase

In some cases, conveyances of land involved in land
democratization efforts take the form of purchase, with
beneficiaries buying land either from a private owner or from the
state162 with any of a number of levels of state assistance.163 In
other instances, the state can make a gift of land rights to the
new owner, without requiring the new owner to pay for the right
received. In the most complex cases, the conveyance involves a
combination of a gift and a purchase. In these situations, the
state can absorb part of the purchase price of the land,164 either
by paying or forgiving part of the principal of the loan. Likewise,
a loan that the government subsidizes at below-market rates can
also be considered a form of a gift and purchase combination,
with the state providing a gift of an interest rate subsidy on what

162
State purchase and then resale to land reform beneficiaries was one of the
tenets of Guatemala’s recent land reform. JONAS, supra note 71.
163
See discussion infra Part III.D.
164
In the case of the community of La Florida in Guatemala, the government
provided the community with a relatively low-interest loan and then forgave
approximately thirty percent of the loan principal at the time of initiation. Interview
with Community Board of La Florida (June 17, 2010).

FINAL_CAVALIERI

44

10/21/2015 4:59 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1

would otherwise be a more costly, market-rate loan.165 The key
distinction here is who is paying for the right obtained: the state,
the beneficiary, or both parties together.
B.

Beneficiaries Can Receive Title or Access to Land

Land reform programs can provide land to beneficiaries
based on titular rights or access rights. In many instances, land
reform programs help individuals gain formal legal title to
property.166 These beneficiaries hold their rights to the land in
what American property scholars might refer to as fee simple
absolute. In some cases, the state may restrict the right of these
fee simple owners to alienate the property. In other cases, the
land is alienable, whether immediately or after some waiting
period designed to prevent land reform from serving as a quick
cash scheme.
It is also possible for land reform to occur without formally
conveying title to new owners.167 In these cases, democratization
of rights to arable land can be accomplished through provision of
access, but not title, to property.168 The state would typically
retain the title, permitting individuals to farm state lands.169 In

165
Susana Gauster & S. Ryan Isakson, Eliminating Market Distortions,
Perpetuating Rural Inequality: An Evaluation of Market-Assisted Land Reform in
Guatemala, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1519, 1520–21 (2007) (noting the necessity of
subsidized lending to provide purchase money to poor Guatemalan farmers who are
not creditworthy). Most home purchases in the United States could also be
characterized as falling into this category, as backing by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
likewise reduces interest rates. See About Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, FED.
HOUSING FIN. AUTHORITY, http://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMae
andFreddieMac/Pages/About-Fannie-Mae---Freddie-Mac.aspx
(“By
packaging
mortgages into [mortgage backed securities] and guaranteeing the timely payment
of principal and interest on the underlying mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
attract to the secondary mortgage market investors who might not otherwise invest
in mortgages, thereby expanding the pool of funds available for housing. That makes
the secondary mortgage market more liquid and helps lower the interest rates paid
by homeowners and other mortgage borrowers.”).
166
As the formalization of individual titles to property is often another goal of
land reform, see discussion supra Part I.A.2., generation of formal title pursuant to
redistribution can serve these two goals of agrarian reform simultaneously.
167
Winoto, supra note 6, at 6 (describing how peasants historically accessed
land by tenancy or customary tenure, not ownership).
168
Id.
169
This is distinct from a leasehold with the state as landlord and the farmer as
tenant; these rights involve formalized access without paying rent. PIERO
GLEIJESES, SHATTERED HOPE: THE GUATEMALAN REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1944–1954, at 151 (1991) (describing life tenure on state owned lands, with
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granting a right to cultivate a specific tract of land without
holding title, the resulting land reform initiative separates
ownership rights from usage rights.170 Where this occurs,
individuals may not obtain some of the key benefits associated
with property ownership, such as the ability to mortgage
property for purposes of obtaining loans.171 Yet this kind of
arrangement can offer many of the food security172 and poverty
reduction benefits that land reform ideally provides for landless
peasants.173 Modern states are also considering more creative
hybrids of title and access rights, such as the registration of land
certificates that formalize local tenure practices and can be sold
or used as collateral but are not recognized by the state as
carrying the significance of a title.174
C.

Beneficiaries Can Hold Land Rights Individually or
Collectively

Land reform programs can also differ on the basis of how
recipients of land hold their rights. In many instances, land
reform initiatives provide land on an individual basis, permitting
individual owners or families to obtain title or access to small
trivial payments of three percent of farm output per year for twenty-five years
following parcelization).
170
Put another way, some land reform initiatives separate certain incidents of
ownership from the traditional bundle of rights and bestow them on parties other
than the title owner. Vance, supra note 85 (stating that absolute ownership in the
Anglo-American law of real property consists of a “bundle of rights, powers,
privileges and immunities”). While common American perceptions of property rights
center on individual ownership, access rights without title are not entirely foreign in
the American context. Recent scholarship has documented the rise of sharing
economy programs through which individuals use others’ property without gaining
title, such as car sharing initiatives. James A. Kushner, Car-Free Housing
Developments: Towards Sustainable Smart Growth and Urban Regeneration
Through Car-Free Zoning, Car-Free Redevelopment, Pedestrian Improvement
Districts, and New Urbanism, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2005) (“Although
the concept appears anathema to American culture, car-sharing activity has
increased in the U.S.”).
171
For further discussion of this point, see supra Part I.A.2.
172
“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” AMNESTY INT’L, ZIMBABWE:
POWER AND HUNGER—VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD (2004), available at
https://www.amnesty.ie/reports/zimbabwe-power-and-hunger-–-violations-right-food.
173
See supra Part I.A.1.
174
See Delville, supra note 27, at 28–29 (describing this system in Benin and
noting that it is a hybrid between a formal, title-driven land system and the system
of local or customary rights to land).
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tracts of land for their own use.175 These approaches most
resemble dominant modern norms of property ownership,176 with
individuals, nuclear families, or perhaps extended family units
holding rights autonomously.
Efficiency concerns may justify deviating from these norms
in the design of land reform.
Because lands that are
redistributed have often been used for large-scale commercial
production, the property may not be easily susceptible to
cultivation by individual smallholders.177 In some instances, this
is because the parcel covers a variety of terrain with some
portions appropriate for cultivation of commercial crops or
grazing of animals, other sections suitable for small-scale
subsistence production of staple food, and other segments
offering infrastructure such as housing, roads, or crop processing
and storage facilities.178 Given that individual recipients of
property through land reform may want access to land for all of
these purposes, including use of the centralized infrastructure
and facilities, dividing an existing plantation and generating
individual title to small tracts of land may not be the most
efficient approach.
Furthermore, existing large-scale infrastructure may be
essential for cultivation. For example, in many arid places in the
world, complex irrigation systems or chemical inputs make
cultivation possible; in the absence of large-scale coordination to
make these supports available, productive farming may be
difficult.179 In other cases, while the land may be cultivable on a
175
GLEIJESES, supra note 169, at 150, 160 (describing parceling of land and the
rejection of collectivization as contrary to the land tenure practices in Guatemala in
the 1940s).
176
See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243, 1244 (1968) (explaining the modern preference for individual title).
177
“Smallholder” is a term used commonly in the development literature to refer
to individuals who cultivate small tracts of land. See generally ROBERT MCC.
NETTING, SMALLHOLDERS, HOUSEHOLDERS: FARM FAMILIES AND THE ECOLOGY OF
INTENSIVE, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE (1993).
178
The community of La Florida in Guatemala uses the former plantation house
as a guesthouse for its ecotourism business and has maintained all of the centralized
facilities for processing and storage of coffee. Interview with Community Board of La
Florida, June 17, 2010.
179
In 1986, prior to the implementation of Zimbabwe’s land reform programs,
Zimbabwe’s grain production alone was sufficient to compensate for the 1.6 million
ton shortfall of eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. After the more radical
reforms of the late 1990s, access to inputs was lost. Zimbabwe’s commercial farmers
who lost their land in the late 1990s could have fed Zimbabwe and “many of the
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small scale, large-scale mechanized facilities on the property
permit farmers to process their agricultural products, adding
value by generating a processed, market-ready crop instead of an
unprocessed raw material.180 Farmers with access to such
facilities are able to obtain higher prices for their commodity
crops, since they internalize additional steps in the processing of
the crop and reduce the number of actors to be paid for
performing discrete steps in the production of the commodity.181
In some cultures, traditional patterns of land tenure have
involved communities exercising their land rights collectively.182
Customary land rights in many parts of the world have evolved
in parallel with systems of formal titling; these customary rights
are based on local practices and administration, but not formal
rules and processes for registering legal claims of rights to
property.183 When indigenous groups or other organizations of
people are the beneficiaries of land reform, generating land
rights in a collective fashion is consistent with existing land
usage practices and may produce desirable efficiencies.184 The
traditional Mexican ejido system offers one example of land
reform in which individuals receive access rights and
communities hold titular rights.185
millions of people risking starvation in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and
Swaziland.” See Degeorges & Reilly, supra note 61, at 573.
180
For example, large coffee plantations include centralized processing facilities
for depulping, fermenting, drying, and milling coffee, resulting in green coffee, which
is a stable commodity ready for shipping. Stephen G. Bunker, Coffee and the
Guatemalan State, in GLOBALIZATION ON THE GROUND: POSTBELLUM GUATEMALAN
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 129, 138–40 (Christopher Chase-Dunn et al. eds.,
2001).
181
Rick Welsh, Farm and Market Structure, Industrial Regulation and Rural
Community Welfare: Conceptual and Methodological Issues, 26 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES
21, 22 (2009).
182
S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua:
A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002).
183
See Delville, supra note 27, at 29.
184
In some instances, this model runs into conflict with the role of the state in
redistributing land because the power to assign land access has been a key aspect of
local, often traditional, authorities in the conduct of customary tenure models. Moyo,
supra note 14, at 189.
185
William D. Signet, Grading a Revolution: 100 Years of Mexican Land Reform,
16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 481, 515–17 (2010) (describing post-Revolution ejido land, and
restrictions on alienation and mortgaging). Contemporary American Indian tribal
land is often held in this model. The tribe holds all rights to the property consistent
with fee simple ownership but subject to “an absolute restraint on alienation to
every grantee other than the United States.” SINGER, supra note 28, at 762. The
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As a result of these characteristics inherent in certain forms
of agricultural production or resulting from historic land usage
patterns, holding title in some collective manner may be
preferable to individual title. Collective forms of title are
complex and varied; they can take forms as simple as a loose
association of individuals who are affiliated for practical
purposes, appear as complex as a formal cooperative structure in
which individuals hold shares in a collective entity, or assume a
variety of other, locally determined models.186 There are also
differences in how that owner collective functions as a legal
entity in the state.187 What rights the individual maintains
within the collective can also distinguish forms of collective
ownership. In some situations, individuals may be able to sell
their property on the open market,188 while in other cases, the
title may bar individuals from selling their shares of the
property.189 Where title is held collectively but private individual
sale is barred, individual rights are analogous to those in
situations where the state grants access to state-owned property;
the individual possesses rights of use and access without holding
the right of market alienation.190
tribe can distribute usage rights among its members and otherwise protect
individuals’ property rights to the use of that land, but individuals likewise cannot
alienate the property since they hold subject to the tribal title. Id. However, the
rights of American Indians to exercise authority and jurisdiction over Indian
Country continues to be influenced by the repudiated U.S. policy of allotment, see
Tweedy, supra note 29, at 137–39, in which the United States “attempt[ed] to
forcibly assimilate Indians by breaking up tribal land holdings and distributing
allotments of the land to individual Indians,” who thereby gained the right to
alienate their allotments of previously tribal land. Id. at 133.
186
These models of collective ownership are susceptible to many of the typical
critiques of common property ownership. See generally Hardin, supra note 176.
Individual communities have crafted interventions to resolve some of these
problems, such as informal division of the land for purposes of cultivation and
residence, with collective processing and use of common facilities.
187
See Delville, supra note 27, at 28–40 (discussing customary land rights and
observing that such rights often have complex, collective aspects).
188
Since 1992, Mexican law has permitted voluntary privatization by ejidos, if
its members wish to do so. The decision is left with individuals about whether to
privatize their share or not, but other ejido members have a preferential right to
purchase. Signet, supra note 185, at 524–25. This model is similar to co-op
apartment buildings in New York City, which permit individual owners to buy and
sell their apartments as shares in the building.
189
SINGER, supra note 28, at 762 (stating that individual American Indians who
possess usage rights to tribal lands lack the right to alienate).
190
In these cases, formal conveyance occurs from the state or a private owner to
a collective entity, such as an ethnic group or cooperative. The members of that
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D. State Involvement Can Range from Minimal to Extensive
It is the state’s role in land reform that can most crucially
shape the success of the land reform initiative and the long-term
stability of the nation in which the reform is occurring.191 State
involvement in redistributing land can vary widely across a
whole continuum of interventions differing in their public
legitimacy. At the simplest level, the state could serve as a
facilitator of private transfer, operating as a clearinghouse to
organize landless individuals to collectively purchase a
plantation and helping to connect would-be buyers with willing
sellers.192 The state could either itself offer or contract with
outside organizations to provide technical support to landless
individuals so that once they become the beneficiaries of a land
reform program, the formerly landless are more likely to succeed
as farmers.193 Alternatively, the state can provide subsidized
loans to buyers or loan guarantees to help buyers obtain loans on
the private market.194 In a more robust land reform initiative,
the state might combine these and other possibilities in creative
ways to try to increase the likelihood that a particular individual
or group will succeed in farming, by helping to provide both
rights to land and the technical knowledge necessary to operate a
small agricultural business.195

collective obtain the right to cultivate or otherwise use land but personally receive
none of the other rights of control or management of the property; they might
exercise these rights as members of the collective body but not autonomously as
individual land owners. Signet, supra note 185 (describing historical ejido practices
in Mexico).
191
Winoto, supra note 6, at 13.
192
Though this model would be possible, because of the typical goal of land
reform programs to transfer lands to poor persons, such programs usually lack the
private resources necessary to purchase property independently.
193
Indonesia has included access to agricultural inputs and other needed
assistance as part of its program to change the structure of agrarian ownership.
Winoto, supra note 6, at 6–7. Guatemala’s most recent land reform program, Fondo
de Tierras, adopted this approach, offering the services of agronomists to help
farmers. Gauster & Isakson, supra note 165, at 1524 (discussing marketing and
technical assistance).
194
Guatemala’s most recent land reform program provided subsidized loans to
beneficiaries of its recent land reform initiative. Gauster & Isakson, supra note 165,
at 1523.
195
Zikhali, supra note 102, at 126 (farmer support services).
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In another model of state support, the state could transfer
public land to private landless individuals. This property could
be land that is already public.196 Or it could be idle or abandoned
parcels that are unclaimed.197 It is also possible that the state
instead could obtain privately held land with the intent to
provide it to land reform beneficiaries. In some instances, this
could occur through a free market negotiation.198 In other cases,
it could involve the use of various state powers to incentivize the
sale or donation of land.199 Or, the property could be obtained
through an exercise of eminent domain to take land that is
privately held, with just compensation paid for the property in
question, combined with a future conveyance to other private
individuals.200 Finally, the state could obtain the land by

196

GLEIJESES, supra note 169, at 151 (describing the redistribution of national
plantations during the post-Revolution land reform).
197
Winoto, supra note 6, at 7 (optimizing use of idle land is a central aspect of
Indonesia’s land reform program).
198
The original postindependence land reform program in Zimbabwe set out to
purchase land from white farmers in voluntary transactions using funds from the
international community through the willing buyer, willing seller model. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6; Zikhali, supra note 102, at 125.
199
One obvious example of this would be to tax fallow land more heavily than
productively cultivated land. Such a taxation regime would either incentivize owners
to return land to productive use, thereby increasing employment opportunities in
rural areas, or to sell fallow property, which would increase the amount of land
available for redistribution through land reform efforts. In the United States, the
modern land bank serves an analogous purpose. In the passive land bank model,
land banks can act as holding entities for abandoned properties. Thomas J.
Fitzpatrick IV, Understanding Ohio’s Land Bank Legislation, FED. RES. BANK
CLEVELAND POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPERS, Jan. 2009, at 1, 2, available at
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/Newsroom%20and%20Events/Publications/Disconti
nued%20Publications/Policy%20Discussion%20Papers/pdp%200925%20understandi
ng%20ohios%20land%20bank.aspx. Or, land banks can adopt a more proactive
approach by actively using tax foreclosures to acquire vacant or abandoned land. Id.
at 5, 7. By clearing tax liens, providing low-cost properties to productive users, and
returning property to the productive tax rolls, the active land bank model can
similarly help facilitate the transfer of privately held property. Id. at 2.
200
This is what occurred in the one case on land reform that has come from the
U.S. Supreme Court. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, private landowners
challenged the state’s land reform statute, which was designed to reduce the
presence of oligopoly in the state’s land tenure patterns by using compensated
eminent domain to broaden the class of land owners. 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984). It
was also the model undertaken in Zimbabwe’s second iteration of post-independence
land reform, in which the 1992 Land Acquisition Act gave the government power to
acquire land by paying fair compensation set according to nonmarket guidelines.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 61, at 6.
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expropriating private property without paying compensation,
though this leads to all of the problems discussed in detail in
Part II.
CONCLUSION: LEVERAGING LEGAL INSIGHTS TO ENCOURAGE
LAND REFORM
This Article set forth to argue for the value of a certain kind
of redistributive land reform program as a model of international
development. It first grounded land reform squarely in its
pragmatic and expressive goals, arguing that land reform can
make a substantive difference in the lives of real people and
developing nations, and therefore is a worthwhile endeavor for
governments to undertake.
Next, it argued that marketcompatible land reform is the most pragmatic approach for
eradicating poverty because it generates the fewest negative
externalities that accrue to the worst-off members of society.
Finally, it explained the wide range of programs that qualify as
redistributive, market-compatible land reform, highlighting the
fact that market-compatibility is an umbrella designation that
encompasses a whole variety of programs.
Only one problem remains: Land reform programs still do
not make available enough land to serve the crucial goal of
eradicating poverty.201
Although this Article advocates for
market-compatible land reform, the reality is that resource
limitations have denied such programs the quantities of land
needed to offer the kind of social change that poor, rural people
need.202 There is “a political and social vacuum in the leadership
of the land reform agenda” that results from civil society
organizations advocating neoliberal approaches based on willing
buyers and willing sellers, while land occupation movements

201
Simon Granovsky-Larsen, Between the Bullet and the Bank: Agrarian
Conflict and Access to Land in Neoliberal Guatemala, 40 J. PEASANT STUD. 325, 328
(2013) (documenting problems with market-led agrarian reform, defined as
programs that “encourage a shift away from state-led land distribution and towards
market transactions intended to assist landless workers and small farmers in
purchasing land” through “willing seller, willing buyer” approaches (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
202
Moyo, supra note 14, at 198 (arguing that rule of law conversations about
human rights have led to critiques of methods of acquisition and expropriation,
without offering alternatives or mobilizing resources for more extensive land
reform).
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continue to be shunned.203 Though this Article does not advocate
for land occupation, such movements reveal the desperation with
which landless peasants face their poverty.
The solution to this problem has multiple parts. First,
market-compatible land reform programs that leverage the
state’s eminent domain power present one major potential source
of land for the rural poor; providing this land through
market-compatible eminent domain mechanisms does not
threaten the destabilization that rightly concerns policymakers.
Second, in order to properly conceptualize land reform at the
intersection of property law and international development, these
ideas require testing in the field and application to particular
land reform programs. One future project in this series will
refine this work by analyzing the successes and failures of
particular land reform programs according to the framework
articulated here.
Third, legal scholarship can propose many alternative ways
to put more resources—land and money—into land reform
programs. The best insights of legal scholars can improve
dramatically the way that land reform programs operate, which
only can assist in the realization of the goals here articulated.
How to put rural lands into productive use to address the kinds
of poverty here discussed remains a pressing problem. Legal
scholars can help identify methods by which nations can support
the kinds of programs explained in this Article. Capping the
percentage of assets an individual can hold in real property is
one possible approach.204 Or, governments can force large-scale
landowners to choose between being taxed at full market value
for their property or selling to the government at below market
rates.205 The government can attempt to shift the paradigm of
land use by creating incentives to bring fallow, underutilized
lands,206 often held by elites,207 into the productive economy.

203

Id.
GEORGE COOPER & GAVAN DAWS, LAND AND POWER IN HAWAII 6 (1985).
205
Id. at 7.
206
JONAS, supra note 71, at 181 (indicating that Guatemala’s post–Civil War
peace accords provided for a tax on unused land).
207
Moyo, supra note 14, at 189 (“Discriminatory land use policies and practices,
and land tenure laws have tended to encourage underutilization of land or inefficient
land use among large-scale farmers . . . .”).
204
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These are an initial set of starting points that highlight how
legal scholarship is a source of solutions and interventions. This
project thus is an invitation to others, particularly American
legal scholars, for whom poverty and human suffering is a
preoccupation to bring their methods and theories to bear on
global poverty and inequality. The insights of many doctrinal
areas can be leveraged to build upon and improve the framework
laid here.

